Watermarking Cryptographic Functionalities from Standard Lattice Assumptions

Sam Kim and <u>David J. Wu</u> Stanford University

How to Watermark a Image?



How to Watermark a Image?



How (Not) to Remove a Watermark



Removing the watermark destroys the image

[NSS99, BGIRSVY01, HMW07, YF11, Nis13, CHNVW16, BLW17]

```
void serveur1(portServ ports)
{
    int sockServ1, sockServ2, sockClient;
    struct sockaddr_in monAddr, addrClient, addrServ2;
    socklen_t lenAddrClient;

    if ((sockServ1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    if ((sockServ2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
}
```

[NSS99, BGIRSVY01, HMW07, YF11, Nis13, CHNVW16, BLW17]

```
void serveur1(portServ ports)
{
    int sockServ1, sockServ2, sockClient;
    struct sockaddr_in monAddr, addrClient, addrServ2;
    socklen_t lenAddrClient;

    if ((sockServ1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    if ((sockServ2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
        Eurocrypt 2017
```

[NSS99, BGIRSVY01, HMW07, YF11, Nis13, CHNVW16, BLW17]

```
void serveur1(portServ ports)
{
    int sockServ1, sockServ2, sockClient;
    struct sockaddr_in monAddr, addrClient, addrServ2;
    socklen_t lenAddrClient;

    if ((sockServ1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    if ((sockServ2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    Eurocrypt 2017
```



[NSS99, BGIRSVY01, HMW07, YF11, Nis13, CHNVW16, BLW17]

```
void serveur1(portServ ports)
{
    int sockServ1, sockServ2, sockClient;
    struct sockaddr_in monAddr, addrClient, addrServ2;
    socklen_t lenAddrClient;

    if ((sockServ1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    if ((sockServ2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    Eurocrypt 2017
```





If mark is removed, then program is destroyed

[NSS99, BGIRSVY01, HMW07, YF11, Nis13, CHNVW16, BLW17]

```
void serveur1(portServ ports)
{
    int sockServ1, sockServ2, sockClient;
    struct sockaddr_in monAddr, addrClient, addrServ2;
    socklen_t lenAddrClient;

    if ((sockServ1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    if ((sockServ2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    Eurocrypt 2017
```

Embed a string within the program

 Notion only achievable for functions that are not learnable





If mark is removed, then program is destroyed


[NSS99, BGIRSVY01, HMW07, YF11, Nis13, CHNVW16, BLW17]

```
void serveur1(portServ ports)
{
    int sockServ1, sockServ2, sockClient;
    struct sockaddr_in monAddr, addrClient, addrServ2;
    socklen_t lenAddrClient;

    if ((sockServ1 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    if ((sockServ2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) {
        perror("Erreur socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    Eurocrypt 2017
```

- Notion only achievable for functions that are not learnable
- Focus has been on cryptographic functions





If mark is removed, then program is destroyed

Existing constructions (that is robust against arbitrary removal strategies) all rely on indistinguishability obfuscation [CHNVW16, BLW17]

Existing constructions (that is robust against arbitrary removal strategies) all rely on indistinguishability obfuscation [CHNVW16, BLW17]

Conceptually seems like an obfuscation-like primitive (embed a string within a program that an adversary cannot remove)

Under standard lattice assumptions, there exists a (secretly-verifiable) watermarkable family of PRFs.

Under standard lattice assumptions, there exists a (secretly-verifiable) watermarkable family of PRFs.

private puncturable PRFs


[BLW17, BKM17, CC17]

Does not seem sufficient for watermarking

standard lattice indistinguishability assumptions

private programmable programmable private private private private programmable private privat

Under standard lattice assumptions, there exists a (secretly-verifiable) watermarkable family of PRFs.



Under standard lattice assumptions, there exists a (secretly-verifiable) watermarkable family of PRFs.

private puncturable PRFs [BLW17, BKM17, CC17]

private translucent PRFs [KW17]

private programmable PRFs [BLW17]

Does not seem sufficient for watermarking

Sufficient for watermarking

Thank you!

http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/380