REEVALUATING US TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS

Full Abstract

1. Discussion of current policies, their origin and historical effects.
2. Analysis of today's global situation and its significance.
3. Evaluation of proposals set forth by various groups, commercial and international.

Much of current U. S. policy has been based on safeguarding technology from American enemies, traditionally the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc countries, and militant dictatorships. Further, many of the items the policies were designed to protect were munitions and technology that could advance research of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear). Today many of these old threats have disappeared.

Now we face different enemies: terrorism and high-tech economic competition. Because the "new threats" antiquate the old military formula for policy, the question arises whether the policies born from them are still necessary or relevant. Current areas of concern involve supercomputers and strong software encryption. We are faced with a dilemma -- does the economic benefit from selling the technology outweigh the security risk posed by its dissemination.

The current discussion is divided into two poles. One group believes that the United States possesses a monopoly on relatively scarce technology; release of it to the outside world breeds a severe threat to domestic security. The other camp contends that technology is freely available, that technology must be exported for American companies to remain competitive, and that the security risk is either nonexistent or unpreventable.

So in the end, what should be changed, what should be kept? How should we view American policy in light of new developments and new technologies? With America's security in one hand, and our economic stake in the other, what should the United States policy be for the next millennium?