The Use of Computerized Vote Counting


"By the very nature of their work, election officials lend themselves to computerization. All the items that pass through an election office - names of registered voters, residential addresses, candidate names, district numbers, precinct numbers, votes cast, etc. - are discrete pieces of information which can and usually must be counted, stored and later recalled. Because computers do that sort of thing very well, it was inevitable that election officials would adopt this new technology."

- The Federal Election Commission publication Computerizing Election Administration


Computers were first used in the voting process in 1964, when five counties in the United States made use of them in the November election.[Wilcox and Nilsson, pg 19] Since then, their presence has grown, by 1988 31% of the counties in America were using computer systems to count 55% of the popular vote.["Vulnerable On All Counts", pg 12] By 1992 two-thirds of American voters were using computerized systems to cast their ballots.[Harrar] Their introduction has been unregulated and generally unnoticed. Yet there use raises new concerns over the continuing security of our election process. A 1988 Bureau of Standards report listed problems with 26 computerized elections.["Vulnerable On All Counts", pg 16] Since that time, various experts have pointed out the possible vulnerabilites of computerized voting systes and possible steps to ensure election security.

Many tasks go into running an election. Before the election date boundaries must be drawn dividing precincts, candidates and initiatives must be filed and placed on the ballot, voters must be registered, campaign information must be monitored and voting information supplied. On the election date, the ballots must be cast then tallied. The election results must then be certified and released.["A General Model"] Computers are being used in all of these tasts, but it is their use in the casting and counting of ballots that is the greatest concern.

There are several types of computer systems used in vote tallying. The most common is the punch card system, in which the voter punches holes in a ballot to indicate their choices which the computer system then reads. Other systems have the voter fill in boxes as on a standardized test, and some computer systems are used to tabulate the manual entries from various lever machines. Some machines even allow the citizen to enter their votes directly into the computer without a physical ballot. Problems can arise with these systems due to unreliable programs, programs which are difficult to use, a lack of administrative control, confusing ballots, and an overreliance on computer experts to operate and supervise the systems rather than elecion officials.[Wilcox and Nilsson & "Vulnerable on All Counts"]

Elections in the United States have traditionally been protected by three safeguards built into the system: Decentralization ensures that any mishaps in one precinct will have little effect on the overall result; the active involvement of both political parties allows each to monitor the other; and the elections visibility to public scrutiny allows us all to observe the process.[Kimberling, pg 11] These traditional safeguards are threatened by the use of computers in the election process. Computers are instrinsically centralized. Their programming is done once, then replicated. With the same systems in use in many precincts, a small error could have enormous impact. Computer systems exclude party representatives from the process as well as election officials. Supervision of the election is entrusted to a technician and the computer itself. Likewise, the process is no longer visible to the public. As one FEC official stated, "few ordinary citizens have been initiated into the mysteries of source codes, programs, and computer operations. All they see now is the computer doing something with the votes."[Kimberling, pg 12]

The problem of observing computerized voting systems is compounded by the fact that these systems are often written in uncommon languages and assembly code, making programs difficult for even experts to determine whether thay have been designed correctly. According to Bob Wilcox and Erik Nilsson, "Election computer programs are not subject to design or source code inspections by independent auditors outside the vendor, as banking software is..." however, " even if election officials had access to source code for vote counting programs, few would be able to obtain the resources to determine its quality."[Wilcox and Nilsson, pg 19]

With few people possesing the knowledge and access to inspect the systems programming, it is possible to hide fraudulent instructions within the system. Trapdoors could be utilized to allow an operator to bypass the computer's security system with a special password. A time bomb the intruder does not need to be onsite at the time of the election. Access to the computer at any previous point could allow one to include code set to activate only at the time of the election, allowing the system to pass operational and quality tests. Similarly, a the code could be in the form of a trojan horse, hidden inside another useful program. In any of these cases, the code could include instructions to switch off the audit trail, preventing anyone from observing the damage done.["Vulnerable on All Counts", pg 14] The program could modify the election in any number of ways; for example, casting invalid ballots in a desired manner, discarding a portion of the valid ballots cast for the unwanted candidate or issue, adding extra ballots, misreading some or all of the ballots, or simply changing the election results in their report form.["Vulnerable on All Counts", pg 14]

In examining breakdowns in election security one must look past the vote-counting technology, itself, and must examine the support variables that run the technology. For it isn't the machine that makes it insecure, but the people that build the machine, write the source code and administer the elections. Furthermore, since the computerized vote-counting technology is complex, and not understood by the general populace, it is simple to blame any mishaps and gross miscounts on human and computer error. This may be the reason why there are not many known convictions resulting from computerized vote-counting fraud. Most mishaps, deliberate or accident, can always be blamed on human mistakes in dealing with the computer. As Peter Neumann of SRI states, "In many cases, it's easy to masquerade a potential misuse as an accident. In essence, the two are indistinguishable in many cases." [Peterson, pg. 283] This may be a reason that there are no real cases of convicted vote-counting fraud. Yet, there are many stories of problems plaguing computerized elections. Furthermore, there have been numerous lawsuits and inquiries to computerized election mishaps.

Return to Start