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CURRENT RISKS |
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These technologies are obviously not all bad. They are generally characterized by the phrase "dual-use" meaning that they can have both military and civilian applications. This is what makes placing export restrictions on them so difficult. The US has tried to put in place laws that regulate the sale of technology based on its ultimate use. For instance, it is legal to export supercomputers to China for modeling weather, to Russia for maintenance (not development) of their nuclear stockpile, and strong encryption to international financial institutions. It is not legal to sell computers to foreign military weapons labs, or strong encryption products to the general public in foreign countries. It is na•ve to assume that sales of all equipment to many "civilian" institutions in militarily aspiring third world nations will be used exclusively in that benign setting. As Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control said, "It is a fantasy to think that you can ship strategic computers to places like China and Romania and not have then end up in places like Iran." He continues, with the more bellicose declaration, in reference to the easing of supercomputer export regulations by President Clinton in April of 1994 that "The happiest people in the world tonight are in Pakistan, India, and North Korea, because they can now obtain, through front companies, computer power that previously was beyond their wildest dreams." A further complication arises when the United States does not have a monopoly on a particular technology. As in the case of strong encryption, there exist German (and other) companies who have comparable technology. Since the German government has made it a point not to regulate the exportation of encryption technology for two years (in order to see how the industry will coalesce) these companies are free to sell their wares anywhere in the world. The net effect is a lose-lose situation for the US. One, the countries and groups that were banned from receiving technology still receive it (from foreign sources). Two, US companies are harmed by not being able to compete in these possibly lucrative markets. To have effective trade restrictions, we must seek to create multilateral agreements, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, with other high technology nations so that our policy goals can be met with minimal economic injury. In light of the incidents that occurred between the US, China, and Russia along with the continued pressure by US corporations in favor of the easing of trade restrictions, we are still searching for the "perfect" policy that will maximize economic benefits while minimizing national security risks. Many proposals have surfaced, both in government and from interest groups. Their plans are covered in the next section. |
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