REEVALUATING US TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS |
Full Abstract |
Current U. S. technology export policies have recently come into question. Many groups and ideas exist, but to recommend actions for the future, we must understand the events of the past in the context of the current situation. Toward this goal, we shall explore these topics:
Much of current U. S. policy has been based on safeguarding technology from American enemies, traditionally the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc countries, and militant dictatorships. Further, many of the items the policies were designed to protect were munitions and technology that could advance research of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear). Today many of these old threats have disappeared. Now we face different enemies: terrorism and high-tech economic competition. Because the "new threats" antiquate the old military formula for policy, the question arises whether the policies born from them are still necessary or relevant. Current areas of concern involve supercomputers and strong software encryption. We are faced with a dilemma -- does the economic benefit from selling the technology outweigh the security risk posed by its dissemination. The current discussion is divided into two poles. One group believes that the United States possesses a monopoly on relatively scarce technology; release of it to the outside world breeds a severe threat to domestic security. The other camp contends that technology is freely available, that technology must be exported for American companies to remain competitive, and that the security risk is either nonexistent or unpreventable. So in the end, what should be changed, what should be kept? How should we view American
policy in light of new developments and new technologies? With America's security in one
hand, and our economic stake in the other, what should the United States policy be for the
next millennium?
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